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A Contribution to thé Interprétation of the Lumpa Rising1 )
by Wim M. J. van Binsbergen
1. THE LUMPA PROBLEM
When in January 1976, in response to a complex national and international
crisis, president Kaunda of Zambia announced a state of public emergency, hè
in fact merely re-activated the dormant state of emergency that had been
declared in July 1964 by the then Governor of Northern Rhodesia, in connexion
with the rising of Alice Lenshina's separatist church, commonly called 'Lumpa'.
In the rural areas of N.B. Zambia the fighting between state troops and the
church's members had ceased in October 1964, leaving an estimated death toll of
about 1,500.2) But the state of emergency (implying increased powers for the
government executive) was allowed to continue. It was renewed every six months
and lived through both the attainment of territorial independence (October 1964)
and the création (December 1972) of the Second Republic under the exclusive
leadership of Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP). The
Lumpa aftermath, including the continued présence of thousands of Lumpa
Tefugees in Zaïre just across the Zambian border, was repeatedly cited as a
reason for this continuation.3)
It is not only in this respect that the Lumpa rising appears as a key episode
in post-colonial Zambia. The event lives on as an important référence point in
the idiom of the Zambian elite. Sometimes référence is made to it to express
governmental and party assertiveness, as in Kaunda's remark at a mass ralley in
January 1965:
a) This article is based on my ongoing research, since 1971, into urban-rural relations
and religieus change in Zambia. Given the circumstances described in the opening
section, I did not carry out local fieldwork specifically on the Lumpa church.
The genera! argument however is backed up by research in Zambia (1972-74), both
in the Zambia National Archives and in varions urban and rural fieldwork set-
tings. Moreover, while in Zambia, I informally interviewed a limited number of
people with firsthand knowledge of the Lumpa church, some of them personally
involved in its history. However, the spécifie argument on Lumpa is primarily
based on published sources (including the Zambian press) and secondary analyses,
most of which are listed in the bibliography. My purpose is not to present new
data but to attempt a new interprétation on the basis of available data. For the
present article, I am indebted to Robert Buijtenhuijs, Coen Holzappel, Adam
Kuper and Gerdien Verstraelen-Gilhuis for comments on an earlier draft, and tp
Leny Lagerwerf for bibliographical assistance; my greatest debt is to Simon Si-
monse, who took a keen interest in this study and generously contributed towards
its leading ideas. My more genera! indebtedness, throughout the development of
my approach to Central-African religion and urban-rural relations, to various
persons and institutions, is acknowledged in my other publications, as cited in the
bibliography.
s) Times of Zambia 20/9/1969, as quoted in Gertzel n.d.:41.
*) Tordoff & Molteno 1974:12; Sklar 1974:359; Pettman 1974:95.
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'... we have no intention whateoever (. . .) of legislating against the formation
of any other party, so long as their behaviour inside Parliament and outside is
responsible. If they misbehave, in accordance with the law of the country we
shall ban them. If they misbehave, I repeat misbehave, we shall ban them as we
banned the Lumpa Church.' (Legum 1966:209).
More often, the Lumpa example is used to point out the dangers of religieus
sectarianism for national unity and stable government. This is most clear in the
case of African Watchtower, one of Zambia's largest religieus groupings, with a
long history of clashes with the colonial government. Shortly after independence,
Watchtower adhérents incurred the wrath of government and the party for their
refusai to register as voters, buy party cards or honour the Zambian flag and
national anthem. In that context, comparisons with the Lumpa church were
frequently made, partly in justification of the tough measures taken against
Watchtower.4) The use of Lumpa as a référence, and the comparison between
Lumpa and Watchtower, have become so commonplace, that the Zambian
historian Meebelo, himself a government official, adopts the somewhat ana-
chronistic comparison between Lumpa in 1963-64 and early Watchtower in 1918
(Meebelo 1971:141).6) Likewise, référence to the Lumpa events played an im-
portant rôle in the discussion, within the Zambian government, that preluded
the final banning of the Zambian wing of the Zaïre-founded 'Church on Earth
through Simon Kimbangu'.
But the most typical attitude towards the Lumpa episode among the Zambian
elite has been one of embarrassment and silence. One gets the impression of
a home truth that one is not at all keen to share with outsiders. The rising was
not only a national crisis but also a crisis in the home ties and kin relations of
UNIP's top leadership. Chinsali district, where the conflict concentrated, was
the home both of the nationalist leaders Kaunda and Kapwepwe, and of the
Lumpa foundress, Lenshina. Kaunda and Lenshina had been at the same
school. Robert Kaunda, the President's eider brother, was a top-ranking Lumpa
leader, whilst their mother, the late Mrs. Helen Kaunda, was reported as having
been 'close to the movement' (Hall 1968:229f). But it was not just childhood
réminiscences and family ties that made Kaunda's décision, three months before
independence, 'to use force against the Lumpas (...), as hè told me at the
time, the hardest décision he had ever taken in his life' (Legum 1966:xii).
The long and hard struggle for independence had seemed over with the January
1964 élection, which gave the then Northern Rhodesia its first African party
government under UNIP.6) The world's eyes were on what was soon to be
Zambia. After campaigning for Black government for years, UNIP, Kaunda and
his Cabinet, however 'well-balanced and extremely capable' (Mulford 1967:330),
now had to prove themselves. The country was ready to reap all the economie,
*) Mwanakatwe 1968:253f; Phiri 1975; Hodges 1976; Sklar 1974:359; Pettman 1974:
29, 96f; Assimeng 1971:110f.
5) Interestingly, the comparison was suggested to Meebelo by the influential nestor
of Zambian Protestant ministers of religion, the late Rev. Mushindo, whose re-
fusai to accommodate Alice any longer within the Lubwa Mission congrégation
formed an occasion for the founding of Lumpa as an independent Church. On
early Watchtower, cf. note 18.
6) For detailed studies of Zambia's attainment of independence, see: Mulford 1967;
Hall 1968; Krishnamurty 1972.
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social and moral benefits that self-government was expected to entail. At this
extremely inconvénient moment the Lumpa rising had to occur. It demanded a
death toll far exceeding that of the genera! clashes (commonly called 'Chachacha')
between the colonial government and the nationalists in 1961.7) The rising
manifested the existence of massive and intransigent opposition to UNIP and to
an African government, in the part of Zambia that had been UNIP's main rural
stronghold. For years the UNIP leadership, and foremost Kaunda, had through
tremendous efforts but rather successfully attempted to keep the rank and file of
their membership from violent anti-white agitation; but now the Lumpa rising for-
ced an African government to direct a predominantly African military force against
fellow-Africans. Kaunda was compelled to suspend his Ghandist principles of
non-violence, which until then had been such an integral aspect of his identity
as a nationalist leader, and of bis splendid international image. Also, the rising
could not fail to focus attention on such acts of violence by local UNIP mem-
bers as were, from the beginning, recognized to constitute part of its causes8).
An extensive process of attempted reconciliation, undertaken by Kaunda and
other senior UNIP leaders in the months preceding the final conflict, had failed.
Instead of the nationalists' promise of a new, proud African order, there was
chaos and fratricide. White racialists and critics of nationalism could sit back
and rejoice. The blow to nationalist self-confidence was almost fatal.
While the insurrection was effectively quashed, angry déclarations of the
obvious juridical justifications of this state action, as issued by Kaunda and his
Cabinet, could barely hide the distress and embarrassment of the nationalist
leaders. In the terrible dilemma, it was soon realized that reconciliation, not
retaliation was the only way out. Whilst Lumpa's alleged fanaticism, criminality
and hérésies were vehemently condemned, measures were taken to limit the num-
ber of casualties to an absolute minimum. Local people who were loyal to the
state and the party were urged to refrain from all retaliation. Rehabilitation
camps were erected and resettling campaigns were vigorously undertaken. When
captured, the Lumpa church's senior leadership, including Lenshina, were treated
respectfully. An amnesty for the Lumpa rank and file was declared in 1968.
However, the ban on the Lumpa church imposed in August 1964 was not
lifted, and Lenshina remained in custody. After the rising the Lumpa adhérents
found themselves dispersed all over N.B. Zambia. Experiencing difficulties in
resettling in their home areas, amongst people with whom they had fought, a
graduai exodus took place to Zaïre. In the years 1965-68 the number of Lumpa
refugees in that country increased to about 19,000, and only about 3,000
returned to Zambia after concentrated governmental effort in 1968. ") The
Lumpas in exile have continued to form a reminder of what by now has taken the
proportion of a major trauma of the Zambian nationalist dream. The main
other reminder consists of the occasional trials of individuals who within Zambia
were caught in the act of reviving the Lumpa church's organisation and ritual
(revolving particularly around Lenshina's talented hymns). Such trials, in which
again a reconciliatory attitude prevails, have occurred in small numbers through-
7) Cf. Hall (1968:209) for some conservative figures on the death toll of 'Chachacha'.
Macpherson (1974:340f) gives a more vivid, lengthy description suggestive of a
large number of casualties, but does not actually provide an estimate.
8) Report... 1965, as quoted in Gertzel n.d.:40, and in Times of Zambia 22/9/1965;
Kaunda in Legum 1966:108; Roberts 1972:39f.
9) Zambia Mail 4, 21/6/1968.
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out the 1960's and early 1970's.10) The final gesture of reconciliation was.
Lenshina's release in December 1975. ")
The extent to which the Lumpa rising and its aftermath does constitute a
collective trauma for the Zambian elite, can also be gauged from the silence
surrounding it. The occasional vindications by the UNIP leadership at the time
of the rising, and Meebelo's cursory référence as cited above, are virtually the
only published statements on the subject by members of the Zambian elite.
The 1965 official Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the former Lumpa
Church is not easily available within Zambia. Expatriate writers who covered
the details of the création of independent Zambia, and who therefore for their
data collection and publication were highly dependent on official introductions
and clearances, are remarkably réticent on the subject.12) They have certainly
not attempted any interprétation of the significance of the Lumpa rising. Th&
final conflict, and the preceding rise and development of the Lumpa church, is still
considered too sensitive a topic for resarch within Zambia.
Thus in this time of rapidly expanding insights into African religieus inno-
vation, our knowledge of and insight into the Lumpa episode remains rather
stagnant. At present, the literature on the subject mainly consists of the follo-
wing catégories of publications 18:
a Exploratory scholarly studies of the Lumpa church as an Independent Church
in colonial Northern Rhodesia - written before the final conflict broke out.14)
b A host of journalistic pièces covering the events of the 1964 rising.
c Scholarly articles and notes in which soon after the rising a considérable
number of specialists on African religions innovation and Central-African
society interpreted the conflict, thus providing often hurried attempts to add
a scientific background to the journalistic accounts. Publications in this cate-
gory mainly refer to the pre-conflict studies under (a). ")
d A few scholarly publications in which the available material, including some
unpublished data, is synthesized, and attempts are made at more comprehen-
sive interprétation.16)
The empirical basis is still rather scanty, and so far there is no accomplished
full-size study ") interpreting the Lumpa episode within a widely acceptable
theoretical framework. Yet the literature is sufficiently voluminous for the
Lumpa church to become a standard référence in Africanist writing over the
past two decades. Here, to give a few instances, Lumpa is cited as: an institutiona-
i») E.g. Daily Mail (Zambia) 2/6/1972, 17/7/1972; Times of Zambia 21/3/1972,
l, 5, 20, 25/4/1972, 14, 16, 20/5/1972.
«) Mirror (Zambia) 45, February 1976, p. 3.
12) Hall 1968; Mulford 1967; Macpherson 1974; Rotberg 1967; Krishnamurty 1972.
13) For fuller bibliographical références, particularly on more obscure publications
and journalistic pièces, see: Roberts (1972); Calmettes (1970); Mitchell & Turner
(1966).
") Rotberg 1961; Taylor and Lehmann 1961; Macpherson 1958; Stone 1958; Oger
1960, 1962; Chéry 1959, 1961; Oosthuizen (1968:65) refers to an article by
Audrey I. Richards on the subject, which however most probably does not exist.
16) Anonymous 1964; Emanuel 1964; Fernandez 1964; Martin 1964; Douglas 1964;
Welbourn 1964; Heward 1964; Wilson 1964; Roberts 1964.
16) Lanternari 1965-66; Greschat 1968; Calmettes 1970, 1972; Roberts 1972.
") J. L. Calmettes is presently working on a Ph. D. thesis on the subject for the
University College of Wales, Aberystwyth.
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lized witchcraft-eradication movement (Wilson 1973:94f; Greshat 1965:lOlf);
as a case in point for the claim that Independent Churches re-enact traditional
opportunties for female leadership (Shepperson 1970:48; Lehmann 1963:68);
as an instance of the religieus expression of nationalism (Banton 1970:225); as a
'stark corrective [of the view that] all anti-administration movements were fore-
runners of mass nationalism' (Henderson 1970:591);
and, finally, as an exarnple of the post-colonial rivalry between state and church
(Barrett 1968:246f; Peel 1973:349).
As this sélection of contradictory références makes clear, the relation between
the Lumpa church and the power structure of Zambian society, both before and
after Independence, constitutes a major interpretational difficulty. It is in this
respect that Lumpa constitutes a key to the understanding of contemporary
Zambia.
However, my claim of Lumpa's significance is somewhat at variance with the
attention given to the rising in the two main recent studies of Zambian politics
(Tordoff 1974; Pettman 1974). Both studies summarize the basic facts concerning
the rising and its aftermath. However, in their interprétation they are rather
reserved.
Pettman writes (1974:94):
'Subnational threats to Zambia's unity and security are not only seen in tribalism,
regionalism, and other sectional interests, but also in group loyalties like those
of the Lumpas and the Watchtower Sect. These religious groups are held to
differ from others in that their behaviour and beliefs are 'political', a perceived
challenge to the existing or desired authority of the party and government.'
Correct as this assessment may be, as an analysis of a major episode in modern
Zambian politics it remains on the surface. In what respect are such primarily
religious phenomena as Lumpa and Watchtower, politicall Why do they represent
a threat to the political establishment, and why is the latter's perception of this
threat sufficient reason for suppression and violence? These are some of the
the questions Pettman ignores, and to which the present paper attempts to give
an answer.
In Tordoff s book, Molteno's brief discussion of Lumpa and Watchtower
(Molteno 1974:85f) revolves around the question: what cleavages exist in modern
Zambian society that could be a mobilization basis for political conflict within
the existing, formal party organization and the représentative institutions of the
Zambian political System? For Molteno, religious affiliation
'could form the social basis for political conflict, but ( . . . ) has not done so'
Within the context of his argument, Molteno's narrow conception of political
conflict is justified; and it conveniently excludes Lumpa and Watchtower troubles
from a discussion of political conflict. Yet conflict it remains, and with far-
reaching implications for the distribution of power - the subject matter of
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politics. Therefore, Molteno's explanation of why the unmistakable religieus
cleavage has failed to precipitate political conflict in the narrower sensé of the
word, does not convince:
'The reasons are that Watch Tower and Lumpa together form less than 5%
of the population, and both movements in any case reject political participation'
(Molteno 1974:86).
Are we made to understand that if there would have been more Lumpas,
they would have challenged UNIP in the arena of Zambia's formal political
institutions, instead of engaging in battle against government troops, brandishing
their battle axes and spears and firing an occasional muzzle-loader?
What makes Molteno's approach unhelpful for an understanding of Lumpa,
is that it takes the existing, formal political system such as defined by the political
elite themselves, as ils exclusive frame of référence. This would deny us the
possibility to explore the limits of that system, and to identify such social groups
and institutions as, peripheral to or outside the formai political system, may le-
gitimate it, challenge it, or opt out of it entirely. If it is true that any political
system can only be understood in its wider social context, this is particularly
so in the case of a post-colonial state system that still has to consolidate itself
through processes of incorporation and légitimation. The significance of Lumpa
(and of Watchtower) is that it demonstrates the limits of these processes. Beyond
these limits a considérable number of Zambians refuse to be drawn into the
post-colonial state, and reject its claims of legitimate power. Studying the Zam-
bian political system from this angle helps to reveal its dynamic, even precarious
nature - instead of taking this system for granted as an established and setf-
contained fact.
The Zambian political system is of recent date. It is not yet so deeply rooted
in every part of the Zambian soil and population that it can afford to ignore
challenges from outside this political system, - challenges that undermine its
légitimation and threaten its most fundamental assumptions. It is along such
unes that I will attempt, in this paper, to interpret Lumpa's relations with
nationalism and the state, against the background of the process of class forma-
tion. However, such an approach is only meaningful if the following related
problems are discussed at the same time. Because of what structural conditions
should the post-colonial state expérience difficulties of incorporation and légiti-
mation, particularly with regard to peasants in remote rural areas? For the
rural adhérents of Lumpa form only a small part of the large class of Zambian
peasants; and similar difficulties exist elsewhere in rural Zambia - although
without the spécifie Lumpa features of a large, rural-based independent church,
and armed mass résistance. I have myself studied a similar peasant situation
in Western Zambia (Van Binsbergen 1975, 1976b, 1977e, and forthcoming).
Moreover, we shall have to identify Lumpa's spécifie dimensions of power, parti-
cularly in terms of class and class struggle. Thus we may begin to understand
Lumpa's relations with nationalism and the state, including the final conflict.
Finally, as a religious movement, Lumpa is only one in a long series of religious
innovations that have occurred in Central Africa during the last centuries. The
latest decade has seen considérable growth of our insight into these religious
innovations, their interconnectedness, and their causes. What new light does
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this emerging, comprehensive analysis of Central-AMcan religious innovation,
throw upon the Lumpa movement?
As my argument develops, it will become clear that these several problems are
intimately related, mainly through the thèmes of urban-rural relations, incorpo-
ration processes, and class formation - which are in fact three different terms
for the same phenomenon. Meanwhile, the relations between religion, politics,
and the economie order, as exemplified by the Lumpa problem, constitute a core
problem of society and history. The present argument, however ambitious, does
not pretend to solve the problem. But perhaps it re-arranges the pièces in a way
that may be helpful towards a future solution.
Reversing the order in which the spécifie problems raised by Lumpa were
mentioned above, I shall now first discuss the background of religious innova-
tion in Central Africa; then place Lumpa in this context; then, after a discussion
of its confrontation with nationalism, I shall finally deal with the problems of
incorporation and légitimation of the Zambian state from a more général point
of view.
2. THE BACKGROUND OF RELIGIOUS INNOVATION IN ZAMBIA
2.1. Super-structural reconstruction
In every society, the members have explicit and mutually shared ideas
concerning the universe, society, and themselves. These ideas are supported by
implicit, often unconscious cognitive structures such as studied by structural and
cognitive anthropology. The total arrangement of these éléments can be called
the symbolic order, or the super-structure. The super-structure defines a so-
ciety's central concerns, major institutions, and basic norms and values. Against
these, actual behaviour can be evaluated in terms of good and evil, status and
success. The super-structure is the central repository of meaning for the mem-
bers of society. It offers them an explanatory framework. While thus satisfying
the participants' intellectual needs, the super-structure also, on the level of action,
patterns behaviour in recognized, predictable units (rôles), which the participante
learn in the course of their socialization. Thus the super-structure provides the
participants with a sense of meaningfulness and compétence in their dealings
with each other and with the non-human world. Ritual and ceremonies, as well
as internalization in the personality structure of individual members of society,
reinforce the super-structure and let it persist over time.
On the other hand, every society has what we can a call an infra-structure:
the organization of the production upon which the participants' lives depend, and
particularly such differential distribution of power and resources as dominate
the relations of production.
There is no simple solution for the long-standing problem of the relation
between super-structure and infra-structure. The problem is particularly mani-
fest in the study of religious innovation, political ideology and mass mobilization.
When studied in some concrete setting, it is often possible to détermine the
infra-structural conditions accompanying these phenomena; yet super-structural
éléments - the participants' explicit or implicit ideas - often appear as direct and
major factors in these contexts. The problem becomes acute in situations of
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rapid change. For in a relatively stable situation, infra-structure and super-
structure are likely to be attuned to each other, thé latter deriving thé meaning-
fulness and compétence it conveys, frorn thé infra-structure it expresses, rein-
forces, and légitimâtes. But in situations of rapid change thé relative autonomy
of infra-structure and super-structure becomes more pronounced. As thé infra-
structure undergoes profound changes, thé super-structure bas no longer grip
on, is no longer fundamentally relevant to, the practical expérience of partici-
pants in économie life. The super-structure therefore ceases to convey meaning-
fulness and compétence. This créâtes in thé participants existential poblems: thé
subjective expérience of aliénation. For thèse problems two solutions exist. Upon
thé débris of an obsolète super-structure, thé participants may try to construct
a new super-structure that is more in line with thé altered relations of production;
I shall call this super-structural reconstruction. Alternatively, participants may at-
tack thé aliénation problem on thé infra-structural level: reversing or redefining,
once more, thé altered distribution of power and resources, and the production
process as a whole, so as to bring it in line, again, with their super-structure
that has remained virtually unaltered. A dialectical relation exists between such
infra-structural reconstruction, and thé super-structural solution. For infra-struc-
tural reconstruction requîtes thé coordinated action of a large number of indivi-
duals; to enable this, new super-structural éléments (ideology, new rôles within
new groups) hâve to be created. On thé other hand, participants take to super-
structural reconstruction in response, in thé first instance, to their individual
existential problems, and not on the basis of a detached scientific analysis of
their society's changed infra-structure; in other words, the new ideas the partici-
pants produce, dérive at first from the symbolic order and do not necessarily
correspond closely with thé altered infra-structure. Therefore, their experiments
with new ideas, even if ultimately called forth by infra-structural change, may
often miss thé mark and, failing to restore thé correspondence between super-
structure and infra-structure, may instead lead into a new symbolic order that
is just as remote as their old super-structure, from current infra-structural con-
ditions.
The émergence of a new super-structure is a highly créative process. It re-
quires thé efforts of visionary individuals who experiment with both old and new
symbols (the latter invented, or introduced from elsewhere). The innovators
générale new combinations and permutations of their symbolic material, and
offer their tentative results to the surrounding population. This population shares
with the innovators in their midst, problems of interprétation and compétence,
as caused by the divorce between infra-structure and super-structure. Therefore,
an innovator's proposai of a new super-structure (as one individual's solution
to his own problems) may yet appeal to the population at large as a likely solution
of their own, similar problems of aliénation. The visionary's proposai is there-
fore likely to be adopted at first. On the subjective level, it may give psycho-
logical relief, as long as the participants are confident that the longed-for
solution has been found. But whether the proposed super-structural innovation
actually does or does not correspond more closely than the old super-structure,
with the altered infra-structure, will not be immediately clear. The participants
will find this out gradually, by on the one hand living through their super-
structural innovation, on the other hand continuing to participate in the altered
relations of production. In most cases the super-structural reconstruction attempt
will turn out to be off the mark. After initial success it will die down, as the
people become increasingly aware that the new ideas do not fundamentally re-
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late to the actually prevailing structure of production. Sometimes, however,
super-structural innovation may tune in with the altered relations of production,
and in this way the subjective expérience of aliénation may be dissolved. A
truly revolutionary situation occurs when super-structural innovation at the
same time stipulâtes such infra-structural changes as curb aliénation at the
infra-structural level, i.e. in terms of expropriation and control. Then a lasting
change of the society becomes possible.
Meanwhile, in order to work at all if even during a short time, attempts at
super-structural reconstruction apparently hâve to do three things. First, they hâve
to propound a new arrangement of symbols. Thus they can restore thé sensé
of meaningfulness, subjectively and temporarily, even if thé infra-structure from
which such meaningfulness ultimately dérives is left unaffected. Such a new
arrangement of symbols must then focus on symbols that are eminently effective
and unassailable in the eyes of the participants. The new super-structural re-
construction may be predominantly religious (e.g. Lumpa), political (e.g. Zam-
bian nationalism), or presumably take some other course; essential is, in ail
thèse cases, that thé central symbols appear absolute to thé participants. Secondly,
super-structural reconstruction must restore thé sensé of compétence by stipulating
new forms of action. This action may vary from collective ritual to campaigns to
check party cards. Important is that participants are brought to look upon such
action as bringing about thé new, desired social order where their aliénation
problems will no longer exist. At the same time these actions translate thé move-
ment's central symbols into the context of tangible, lived-through reality, thus
reinforcing them. Finally, attempts at super-structural reconstruction, in order
to be at least initially successful, cannot stop at thé level of merely individual
interprétations and actions, but must create new group structures (e.g. restruc-
tured rural communities, churches, political parties) within which thé partici-
pants can lead their new lives once their aliénation problems will have been
solved subjectively. Recruitment into thèse new groups must be presented as thé
solution to thé problems of individual people. Expansion of thé new group is
often considered thé main method to create a new society in which thé
aliénation problem would no longer exist.
2. 2. Religious innovation in Zambia as super-structural reconstruction
As Vansina pointed out (1966:19f), throughout Central Africa a rather similar
super-structure prevailed before thé récent processes of social change made
their impact. On thé infra-structural level, two major changes occurred since thé
18th Century. The first consisted in thé increasing involvement of local farming,
fishing and hunting communities (which until then had been largely self-con-
tained), in a new mode of production that was dominated by long-distance trade
and by thé payment of tribute to thé states that emerged in Central Africa
largely as a resuit of such trade. The second major infra-structural change was
the pénétration of capitalism. Directly, capitalism induced thé rural population
to leave their villages and work as migrant labourers in thé mines, farms and
towns of Central and Southern Africa; to adapt their rural economy, and in-
creasingly their total life, to thé consumption of manufactured commodities; and,
in selected areas, to embark on small-scale capitalist agricultural production.
Indirectly, thé infra-structural accommodation to capitalism was promoted by
thé colonial state, e.g. by thé imposition of hut tax; thé destruction of pre-
existing networks of trade and tribute; thé transformation of indigenous rulers
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into petty administrators for the colonial state; the régulation of migration between
the rural areas and the places of work; the provision of schools to serve the
need for skilled workers and clerks; urban housing; médical services; the
occasional promotion of African commercial farming, etc. Admittedly, the re-
lations between the colonial state and capitalism are rather more complex than
suggested here, and failure to work out these relations (even if such had been
impossible within the scope of the present article) is one of the shortcomings of
my argument.
The émergence of the trade-tribute mode of production, and the expansion
of capitalism, both constituted infra-structural changes of sufficient scope te-
provide test cases for my provisional theory of super-structural reconstruction.
There is no a priori reason why disjunction between an altered infra-structure
and an old super-structure should lead to predominantly religions super-struc-
tural reconstruction. Historical évidence on Central Africa is still rather scanty
for thé pré-colonial period, but rather abundant for thé colonial era. From
this évidence one gets thé impression that religious innovation has for long
constituted thé main response to récent infra-structural change. Only after World
War II mass nationalisera appeared as a politica! form of super-structural re-
construction, in addition to ongoing religious innovation. Probably this pré-
pondérance of religious super-structural reconstruction has systematic reasons
which a more developed theory may identify in future. An important ad hoc
explanation seems to lie in thé fact that among twentieth-century Zambians
thé concept of politics as a distinct sector of society is a recent innovation.
The modern concept of politics, just like that of religion, can only be meaningful
among the members of a highly differentiated, complex society, where institu-
tional sphères have acquired considérable autonomy vis-à-vis one another. Con-
temporary Zambia has become such a society. But sections of the rural population
continue to reject this differentiated view of politics. Instead they have a rather
holistic conception of society, in which religious, political and economie power
merge to a considérable extent (e.g. Van Binsbergen, forthcoming). In this
respect many peasants have retained the basic outlook of the old super-structure,
in which religious and non-religious aspects appear to have merged almost
entirely.
In the old super-structure, the link with the local dead was the main légiti-
mation for résidence, political office, and for such a variety of specialist rôles
as divining, healing, hunting, ironworking, musical crafts. Through résidence,
vénération of thé local dead, and ritual focussing directly on land spirits, a
special ritual link with the land was established. Without such a link no success
could be expected in economically vital undertakings as agriculture, fishing,
hunting and collecting. The participants' view of the society and of an individual's
career, arranged village life, the economie process, politics and ritual in one
comprehensive framework, where each part has meaning by référence to all
others. This view was, therefore, religious as much as it was political or
economie.
When the trade-tribute mode of production expanded, the émergent major
chiefs initially had to legitimize their political and economie power in terms
of this same view of society. Chiefly cuits came up which enabled the chiefs
to claim ritual power over the land's fertility, either through ritual links with
deceased predecessors, or through non-royal priests or councillors representing
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the original 'owners of the land' (Van Binsbergen 1977b). Thus, as a result of
infra-structural change, symbolic thèmes already present in the super-structure
were redefined; a new power distribution was acknowledged in the super-
structure; and a pattern that in the old super-structure referred to merely local
conditions was now applied to extensive regional political structures which often
comprised more than one ethnie group. However, in this altered super-structure
the merging between religious and political aspects was still largely retained.
Along with these chiefly cults, two other types of religious innovation can
be traced back to the late pré-colonial period and to the infra-structural changes
then occurring: thé appearance of prophets, and thé émergences of cuits of
affliction. Cuits of affliction concentrate on thé individual, whose physical
and/or mental suffering they interpret in terms of possession by a spirit, whilst
treatment mainly consists of initiation as a member of the cuit. Central-African
prophets and thé movements they trigger fall into three sub-types: thé ecological
prophet whose main concern is with fertility and the land; the eschatological
prophet who predicts thé imminent end of thé world such as it is known to his
audience; and thé affliction prophet who establishes a new, regionally-organized
cuit of affliction, which in many respects resembles an independent church. For
an initial treatment of thèse main types, and références, I refer to Carter (1972)
and my own work (1976a, 1977a). Prophétie cuits of thèse subtypes, and cuits
of affliction, hâve continued to appear in Central Africa during the colonial
period, and still represent major forais of religion among thé Central-African
peasants. But in addition, thé colonial era saw new types of religious innovation.
Preachers and dippers (advocating baptism through immersion) appeared. They
were connected, some more closely than others, with thé African Watchtower
movement, which in itself derived indirectly from thé North-American Jehovah's
Witnesses. There were other independent churches which pursued more or less
clearly a Christian idiom. Finally, mission Christianity had in fact penetrated
before thé imposition of colonial rule (1900), but started to gain momentum
much later.
Let us first consider ail thèse cases of religious innovation as super-structural
experiments, which propounded a new symbolic order. Despite their différences
in idiom, ritual and organizational structure, it is amazing to see how thé
same few trends in symbolic development dominate them ail (Van Binsbergen
1976a). Ail struggle with thé conception of time. The cyclical présent implicit
in thé old super-structure (highlighting agriculture, hunting, and gathering at
thé village scale) becomes obsolete. In the course of thèse religious innovations,
it gives way to a linear time perspective that emphasizes personal career and
bistorical development, even to thé extent of interpreting history as a process of
salvation in thé Christian sensé (cf. Eliade 1949). In some of thèse religious
innovations, thé linear perspective is again supplanted by thé eschatological: thé
acute sensé of time drawing to an end. Almost ail thèse innovations try to move
away from the concern for the land and fertility that dominated thé old super-
structure. The village dead as major supernatural entities venerated in ritual
give way to other, less particularistic entities, especially the High God. In line
with this, all these innovations tend to move away from taking the old village
community, in its original form, as their basic concept of society. In the cults
of affliction this process manifests itself in their extreme emphasis on the suf-
fering individual and their underplaying of morality and social obligations. In
some of the other religious innovations the same process reaches further: they
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explicitly strive towards the création of a new and fundamentally different
community, a new society to be brought about by the new religious inspiration
and new ritual. Finally, in so far as in the old super-structure sorcery was
considered thé main threat to human society, these religious innovations each
try to formulate alternatives to sorcery. The cuits of affliction and thé mission
churches attribute misfortune and suffering to causes altogether different from
sorcery. Most of the other innovations continue to accept the reality of sorcery
but try to eradicate it once for all so as to make the new, transformed Community
possible. The constant occurrence of these thèmes throughout recent religious
innovation in Central Africa suggests that underneath the several types, each
representing scores of individual religious movements, one overall and persistent
process of super-structural change took place, in which the same symbolic
material was manipulated within rather narrow limits.
However, when we try to relate these super-structural experiments to infra-
structural change, it becomes necessary to distinguish between two main streams
of super-structural reconstruction. One stream is of exclusively rural origin; the
religious innovators and their followers are peasants. This applies to cults
of affliction, and to the cults created by ecological, eschatological and affliction
prophets. The other stream springs from what we can provisionally call the 'inten-
sive contact situation'.
This comprises the places of work which attracted labour migrants from
throughout Central Africa (mines, farms, towns), and moreover the rural
extensions of these centres: district administrative centres (bornas); rural Chris-
tian missions; and military campaigns involving thousands of African carriers,
and fewer soldiers, near thé Zambian-Tanzanian border in World War I.
Watchtower dippers and preachers, other independent churches, and mission
Christianity are thé religious innovations belonging to this second stream. The
two streams roughly coïncide with thé division rural-urban. But thé following
argument will make clear that much more is involved than a purely geographical
or démographie critérium. This justifies my classifying of such country-side
phenomena as bornas, missions, farms and military campaigns in thé second
stream.
Typical of thé first, truly rural stream is that it comprises people still largely
involved in a pre-capitalist mode of production: shifting cultivation, hunting and
gathering. However, state expansion (before and after thé imposition of colonial
rule), and thé impact of capitalism, hâve infringed on their local autonomy,
draining their products and labour force (through slave-raiding, tribute, forced
labour, migrant labour and urbanization), and encroaching on their rights on local
land, hunting and fishing (e.g. by thé création of chiefs' hunting reserves, and la-
ter by thé founding of commercial farms, towns, mines, native reserves, and
forest reserves). The infra-structure of their local society has been deeply
affected by these development. From free, autonomous farmers whose
system of production was effectively contained within their social horizon
and subject to their own control, they became a peasant class in a world-wide
society. But while thé facts of this process of incorporation and expropriation
are unmistakable and hâve corne to affect every aspect of village life, thé agents
of control in their new situation hâve largely remained invisible at the village
level. The psysical outlets of the state and of thé capitalist economy were confined
to thé district centres and thé towns along the line of rail, outside thé everyday
expérience of thé peasants. Particularly after thé création of indirect rule
(around 1930), administrators and peasants alike could f oster the illusion of an
essentially intact traditional society whose time-honoured social institutions,
though heavily assailed (after all, there was the reality of incorporation and
aliénation), were still functioning. Under thèse circumstances, thé rural popu-
lation's reaction against being forced into a peasant class position could hardly
be expected to confront, immediately, thé outside forces responsible for their
expropriation. One does not expect anti-colonial responses in this context. A pré-
condition for such responses would have been that thé peasants had acquired
some explicit assessment of the power situation in the wider society in so far
as this affected their situation - and were prepared to challenge thèse structures.
But as Gluckman pointed out in one of nis most comprehensive analyses of
political change in Southern and Central Africa,
'there were plenty of hostilities [between Black and White]; but they did not
continually affect the daily life of Africans; and the picture of Africans in con-
stant and unceasing antagonism to whites is false for thé rural areas' (Gluckman
1971:15).
Instead, thé peasants sought a solution for their predicament of aliénation enti-
rely at thé local level; and not primarily through thé création of new relations
of production, but mainly through thé formulation of a new super-structure.
The innovators' messages and their ritual, though explicable from thé predica-
ment of 'peasantization', in nearly ail cases remained without overt références to
this predicament. The various rural-based religious innovations were attempts
to render, on a local scale, village life once again meaningful by new symbols,
restoring the sensé of compétence by new ritual. Whereas thé cuits of affliction
attempted to do this on thé exclusively individual level (and thus dealt with only
part of the problem, even at the mère super-structural level), thé various prophétie
cuits went further. The latter aimed at ushering the local population into a
radically new community. However, usually this community was entirely con-
ceived in ritual terms. Most prophétie cuits did not attempt to work out the
infra-structural requirements, in terms of relations of production, by which such
a new community might really hâve formed a lasting answer to thé predicament
of peasantization; Lumpa was an important exception to this. Divorced from. a
production basis, in other words entirely based on an illusion, most cuits of
affliction and prophétie cuits soon lost their vigour. But their idiom remained
attractive: in many régions we see a succession of such cuits, at intervals of a few
years or décades.
The second stream of super-structural reconstruction sprang from a quite
différent social situation. In thé places of migrant work, thé bornas, thé missions,
and while involved in a military campaign, thé Africans not just experienced the
distant effects of thé expansion of state Systems and capitalism. In général, they
were born and raised within thé peasant context indicated above, retaining more
of less close links with their village kin. Yet they had entered into a différent class
position, or were on their way of doing so. They lived outside their villages, in
a social setting dominated not by thé inclusive, reciprocal social relationships
typical of thé village, but by formai organizations, patterned after those of
modem North-Atlantic society. Their daily working expérience was determined
by forms of control characteristic of capitalist relations of production. In this
situation, their livelihood was entirely dépendent upon their taking part in thé
production process as wage-labourers. Therefore their class position was largely
that of proletarians, even though the majority attempted to keep open the lines
back into the village, and had still rights to rural land should they return home.
The forces of the state and capitalism that in the villages remained distant,
anonymous, and often below the threshold of explicit awareness, were in this
proletarian situation blatantly manifest. These forces pervaded every aspect
of the worker's social expérience, and were personified in concrete people:
white employers, foremen, administrative officers and missionaries. Exploitation,
economie insecurity, humiliation and racial intimidation were the spécifie forms
in which these more immédiate causes of the African predicament were driven
home in this situation. Essentially all this applies equally to the rural Christian
missions. I am not denying that the flavour of human relations in the missions
may have been somewhat more humanitarian than in the migrants' places of
work. But infra-structurally the missions represented a social setting very similar
to the latter, in such terms as: formal, bureaucratie forms of organisation and
control; race relations; prédominance of capitalism, as manifested in exclusive
land rights, wage labour, and distribution of manufactured commodities (cf.
Rotberg 1965).
Africans in the intensive contact situation were experiencing problems of
aliénation rather similar to those of their kinsmen in the village. But their
response had to be different. Well advanced in the process of proletarization,
they had acquired a working knowledge and understanding of capitalist struc-
tures. They could no longer take the strictly local, rural scène as their exclusive
frame of référence. Like the peasants, they feit the existential need for recon-
struction, but then reconstruction of the wider society and particularly of those
manifest (and often superficial) aspects of the power distribution therein that
had caused their most bitter expériences.
For many thousands of people, mission-propagated Christianity seemed to
provide thé solution they were looking for. This religious innovation promised
a new life and a new society. lts organizational structure as well as its moral
and ethical codes were, not surprisingly, well attuned to colonial society and
capitalism. However, for this very reason conversion did not solve thé predica-
ment of aliénation; it added but a new dimension to it.
In thé intensive contact situation a général and explicit reaction was generated
against white domination in both the political and the religious field. Springing
from the same setting, the political and religious responses were rather parallel
and initially merged to a considérable degree. African Watchtower and other
independent churches (including the African Methodist Episcopal Church), are
thé more predominantly religious manifestations of the second, non-rural stream
of super-structural reconstruction. The political manifestations led through
Welfare Societies and labour agitation at the Copperbelt, to the nationalist mo-
vement which took a concrète form after World War II.
Given thé fact of circulatory labour migration, in which a large proportion
of thé Central-African mâle population was involved, thé two streams of super-
structural reconstruction could not remain entirely screened off from each
other. Significant exchanges took place between thé super-structural responses
of peasantization and those of proletarization. The introduction of peasant cuits
of affliction into thé intensive contact situation is a common phenomenon in
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Central Africa. Alternatively, thé 'proletarian' super-structural responses were
soon propagated in thé rural areas as well. As thé social settings of proletarization
and peasantization were very different, the innovations had to undergo substan-
tial transformations as they crossed from one setting to the other. The case of
the Zambia Nzila Sect shows how a cuit of affliction, when introduced into thé
setting of proletarization, could take on a formai organizational structure and
develop into a fully-fledged and exceptionally successful independent church
(Mutemba 1972; Van Binsbergen 1977a).
African Watchtower shows thé opposite process, by which a religious innovation
properly belonging to thé proletarian context, is greatly transformed so as to fit
the context of peasantization. In the late 1920's and the 1930's Watchtower18)
was propagated in thé rural areas of Central Africa at a very large scale. The
proletarian preachers and dippers expressed anti-colonial attitudes, and
attracted state persécution on this basis. However, thé massive peasant audiences
they inspired and brought to baptism, seemed to respond less to their anti-
colonialism and their analysis of thé wider society. Instead, the peasants were
looking for reconstruction of just the local, rural society, by ritual means, and
therefore chose to emphasize selectively thé eschatological and witchcleansing
éléments in thé preachers' messages. And thé latter were not hésitant to oblige.
A case in point is the rapid transformation of Tomo Nyirenda ('Mwana Lésa')
from an orthodox Watchtower in thé typical intensive contact situation, to a
self-styled rural witchfinder whose lethal efficiency cost scores of lives (and
finally his own) (Rotberg 1967:142f; Ranger 1975). Nyirenda's case appears to
have been only an extrême example of what seems to hâve happened to many
Watchtower preachers. Their messages, deriving from a différent class situation,
were rapidly attuned to thé idiom in which thé peasants were phrasing their
own attempts at super-structural reconstruction. The spécifie Watchtower mes-
sage, including its anti-colonial overtones, got lost behind the peasants' percep-
tion of thé preachers as predominantly engagea in thé eradication of sorcery.
They were supposed to usher thé local society into a radically new state, but
on a strictly local scale and ignoring thé wider colonial and capitalist conditions
which had both intensified thé predicament of peasantization, and had triggered
originally thé proletarian Watchtower response.
By no means ail religious innovators who exhorted local rural communities
to cleanse themselves from sorcery had Watchtower connotations. Some were
channelled into other independent church movements. Others were individual
innovators who adopted éléments from thé current idiom (dipping, hymn-
es) On Watchtower in thé period indicated, see e.g. Hooker 1965; Assimeng 1971;
Rotberg 1967:136f; Greschat 1967; Cross 1970, 1973, and by that same author
a number of unpublished papers which however I hâve no authority to cite.
Hooker's référence (1965:99) to Watchtower in Kasempa district, N.W. Zambia,
as early as 1913 (instead of thé correct date of thé 1930's) is based on a misreading
of Chibanza (1961:81). In thé 1910's, African Watchtower in Zambia was confined
to the extreme north-east, where it was closely connected with the military cam-
paign against the Germans in Tanzania, in World War I (Meebelo 1971:133f;
Rotberg 1967:136f). Much of African Watchtower in Zambia indirectly derived
from the movement of John Chilembwe in Malawi, which ended in the 1915
rising (Shepperson Price 1958; for a recent reinterpretation cf. Linden & Linden
1971). My views on the rural adaptation process in Watchtower are based not only
on secondary literature, but also on the eyents in rural Western Zambia in the
1920's-30's, as documented in Zambia National Archives files: KDD 1/4/1; ZA
1/9/1817(3); KDD 1/2/1; KDE 8/1/18; ZA 7/1/16/3; KSX l/l/l; ZA 7/1/17/5;
SEC/NAT/66A; ZA 1/15/M/1.
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singing, the use of a Bible copy and other material paraphernalia for the iden-
tification and cleansing of sorcerers) without identifying themselves as belonging
to any spécifie movement. Many claimed or were regarded to belong to the
Mcape movement, which from Malawi spread over Central Africa from the
1920's onwards. Several other such movements have been described for Zambia
and the surrounding areas.1!))
Willis (1970) has aptly characterized the common purpose of all these rural
movements with the phrase 'instant millennium'. Unlike cargo cults and many
other millennarian movements, these Central-African witchcleansing cults not
only contained the expectation of a radically different new society: they actually
claimed to provide the apparatus and ritual that was to bring about this new
society. Despite waves of religieus innovation that had temporarily superimposed
alternative interprétations, sorcery had remained the standard explanation for
misfortune. In such a context the claim to remove all sorcery from the com-
munity, inevitably amounts to nothing less than the création of a realm of eternal
bliss, of a Community that belongs to a totally different order of existence. Mary
Douglas (1963) suggested that récurrent witchcleansing cults form part and parcel
of the 'traditional' set-up of Central-African rural society. My interprétation would
be rather different. Admittedly, the well-known debate (summarized in Wilson
1973:56) on the methodological difficultés involved in the hypothesis that
modern social change had lead to an increase of sorcery and sorcery accusation,
discourages any further argument along that line. However, instead of a change
in the incidence of sorcery or alleged sorcery, I would suggest that the signifi-
cant element of change lay in the personnel and the idiom of witchcleansing.
This is again not something that is easily assessed for an illiterate past, but at
least it is a qualitative instead of an unsolvable quantitative problem. In the
old super-structure, sorcery formed the central moral issue. The necessity to
control sorcery and to exposé and eliminate sorcerers, was fully acknowledged.
These fonctions were the prérogatives of those exercising political and religieus
authority, or were largely controlled by the latter. The battle against sorcery
was waged continually, and formed a major test for the amount of protection
and well-being those in authority could offer their followers. The removal over-
night of all sorcerers as in eradication movements, does not by any means fit
into this pattern. The cyclical time perception characteristic of the old super-
structure is likewise incompatible with the idea of 'instant millennium'. These
millennarian expectations, the recruitment of witchcleansing agents from amongst
outsiders divorced from local foei of authority (even if often invited and pro-
tected by chiefs), the new symbols (dipping, the High God, hymns and sermons),
the massive response which made whole villages and régions step forward, hand
in their sorcery apparatus, and get cleansed - all this suggest not a récurrent
'traditional' phenomenon, but a dramatic attempt at super-structural reconstruc-
tion, that properly belongs to the chapter of religieus innovation in Central
Africa.
2.3. Super-structural reconstruction, dass struggle and the state
On the descriptive level, I have now prepared the ground for an interprétation
of Lumpa against the total background of recent religious and political move-
") Ranger 1972; Willis provides a lengthy bibliography (1970), including all the
classic références; specifically for N.E. Zambia - the area of the Lumpa church -
cf. Roberts 1972:4f, 8f.
ments in Central Africa. However, for a fuller understanding it is necessary
to examine this material in the light of two fundamental issues: class struggle
and the overall distribution of power. We touch hère on basic problems of both
modern African society and social theory. Therefore, rushing in where angels
fear to tread, the following ideas are offered as extremely tentative.
I have argued that the various super-structural reconstruction movements were
peculiar to the two spécifie class situations of peasantization and proletarization.
However, they were much more than mère sub-cultural traits contributing to the
life-style of a social class (such as diet, fashion in clothing, patterns of récréation
etc.) Directly springing from the predicament of aliénation, and trying to solve
it, these movements should be recognized as manifestations of class struggle.
Here the broad distinction between the peasant stream and the proletarian
stream is relevant, again. The various peasant responses reveal the attempt to
reconstruct a whole, self-supporting, autonomous rural Community. Trapped as
they usually were in super-structural illusions, ignoring thé infra-structural re-
quirements (in ternis of relations of production) for such a reconstruction, most
of these attempts were unrealistic and failed entirely. Yet in essence they are
extremely radical in that they attempt to reverse thé process of peasantization,
by denying thé rural community's incapsulation in a wider colonial and capitalist
System. By contrast, the 'urban' responses were decidedly less radical. For they
took for granted thé fundamental structure of capitalism, and aimed not at an
overthrow of capitalist relations of production, but at material and psychological
improvement of thé proletarian expérience within this overall structure. Thus in
Zambia the proletarian class struggle was fought within the terms of the very
structure that had brought about thé process of proletarization; it was reformist,
not revolutionary. This explains why Zambian nationalism, which ultimately
emerged as thé main response to proletarization (Henderson 1970), entirely
lost its aspect of class struggle. After UNIP realized territorial independence,
this nationalist party and its leaders have instead greatly enhanced state control
as a means to consolidate thé capitalist structure of Zambian society. The infra-
structure was left intact, and after thé replacement of this structure's white
executive personnel by Africans, its further expansion was stimulated. The growth
of UNIP in thé rural areas, where the party increasingly implements and controls
state-promoted projects of 'rural development', represents a further phase in
thé domination of rural communities by the state and capitalism.
Within thé proletarian response Watchtower came closest to radical class
struggle. It did not analyse and counteract the capitalist relations. On thé con-
trary, Watchtower adhérents have been described as quite successfully adapted
to capitalist production. This was particularly the case when the movement, in-
troduced into thé rural areas, could resist thé peasants' redéfinition of its idiom
in terms of witchcleasing, and enduring Watchtower communities emerged20).
However, Watchtower radicalism did show in its théocratie rejection of the
authority of the state - both colonial and post-colonial. Watchtower has thus
opposed a structure of domination that, as I indicated above, was closely linked
to capitalist structures.
Examples of such successful latterday Watchtower communities are described by
Long (1968) and Cross (e.g. 1970).
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This rejection of the state also brought Watchtower close to the peasants' re-
construction attempts. For although the latter were not explicitly anti-state or
anti-colonial, their insistence on a strictly local rural society left no room what-
ever for structures of control beyond the local level. Most Central-Africaa
peasant reconstruction movements were of limited scope, organizationally weak,
and lacked infra-structural initiatives. This caused them, in général, to yield and
die down as soon as effectively confronted with the power of the state. Lumpa,
however, shows the great potential of these movements, once they comprise a
sufficient number of people and explore, in addition to super-structural re-
construction, the possibility of infra-structural reconstruction.
However, incorporation of rural communities in a system of state control
under capitalist conditions is not only an infra-structural problem. The super-
structural innovations discussed hère emphasize the importance of people's
conceptualization of their society, and of their own place therein. It is impossi-
ble to build a state on sheer coercion alone, and anyway the Zambian leaders
would abhor the very idea. In addition to actual control through effective struc-
tures, the Zambian state seeks legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects. In the pre-
sent-day context it is therefore of great importance that the state, as the culmi-
nation of supra-local control, has remained a distant and alien element in the
social perception of many Zambian peasants, also after independence. The colo-
nial state, for various reasons, was contented to have only a distant grip on rural
villages, and concentrated its efforts in the bornas and in the urban centres. The
post-colonial state however is now struggling for both effective domination and
acceptance right down to the grass-roots level of the remotest villages. Expansion
of the party and of other rural foei of state control (schools, clinics, agricultural
extensions, courts) in itself cannot take away the fact that the state still has
not legitimated itself entirely in the eyes of a considérable portion of the Zambian
peasantry. This situation causes strain and insecurity among the Zambian leaders,
and they tend to react forcibly against rural (or whatever other) challenges of
their legitimacy. Of this Lumpa, again, offers an example.
3. LUMPA AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL NORTH-EAST ZAMBIA
We have now reached a stage where we can assess the position of the Lumpa
church as a case of religions innovation, against the genera! background of
super-structural reconstruction in Central-Africa - and where we can begin to
analyse the conflicts this church gave rise to.
The story of Lenshina's first appearance as a prophet and of the founding
years of her church has been told often enough (see the literature cited above).
We can confine ourselves hère to a broad outline. Lenshina was born around
1920, as the daughter of a Bemba villager who had fought against the Germans
near the Tanzanian border, and who had later been a boma messenger. Though
growing up near Lubwa mission, Lenshina was not a baptized Christian when
she received her first visions in 1953. Her husband had been a carpenter with
Lubwa mission but by that time was no longer employed there. Lenshina referred
to the mission with an account of her spiritual expériences. The white missionary-
in-charge took her seriously, saw her through Bible lessons and baptism (when
she received the name of Alice), and encouraged her to give testimony of her
expériences at church gatherings. However, when this missionary went on
leave abroad, and Alice began to develop ritual initiatives on her own, receiving
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even money for them, the African minister-in-charge feit that she could no
longer be contained within the mission church. From 1955 onwards Lenshina
propagated her message on her own behalf, thus founding an independent
church. She collected a phénoménal following around her, which by 1958 was
estimated at about 65,000 (Rotberg 1961:63). Many of these were former con-
verts of Lubwa mission and of the neighbouring Roman Catholic missions. In
Chinsali district and adjacent areas, the great majority of the population turned
to Lenshina's church, which was soon known as Lumpa ('excelling all others').
An organizational framework was set up in which Lenshina's husband Petros
Chitankwa, and other male senior deacons, held the topmost positions. Many
thousands of pilgrims flocked to Lenshina's village Kasomo, which was renamed
Sioni (Zion); many settled there permanently. In 1958 the Lumpa cathedral was
completed to be one of the greatest church buildings of Central Africa. Scores
of Lumpa branches were created throughout Zambia's Northern Province. In
addition, some appeared along the line of rail, and even in Zimbabwe. However,
the rural membership of the church began to drop in the late 1950's, from
about 70% to about 10% of the local population (Information... 1964: 941;
as e.g. the number of emigrant Lumpa-adherents in Zaïre demonstrates, these are
very conservative estimâtes). After various clashes with the chiefs, local missions,
the colonial state, and the anti-colonial nationalist movement, armed résistance
against the state precipitated the 1964 final conflict which meant the end of the
overt existence of Lumpa in Zambia.
Against the background of previous religious innovations in Central Africa,
Lumpa offered a not very original combination of récurrent symbolic thèmes.
Lumpa laid strong emphasis on the eradication of sorcery mainly through baptism
and the surrender of sorcery apparatus. It displayed the linear time perspective
implicit in the notion of salvation, while eschatological overtones only became
very dominant in the few months preceding the final conflict. Lenshina assumed
ritual ecological fonctions such as distributing blessed seeds and calling rain, but
on the other hand imposed taboos on common foods such as beer. The church's
idiom highlighted God and Jezus, while denouncing ancestors, deceased chiefs
and affliction-causing spirits as objects of vénération. Finally, the church aimed
at the création of a new, predominantly rural society - but this time not only by
the ritual means of witchcleansing but also by experiments with new patterns of
social relations and even with new relations of production and control which at
least went some way towards infra-structural change. In this last respect lies the
uniqueness of Lumpa - as well as its undoing.
But before we discuss this aspect, let us try to identify the position of Lumpa
within either the 'urban' of the 'rural' stream of super-structural reconstruction.
The class position of the Lumpa foundress and of the great majority of Lenshina's
adhérents was that of the peasantry. Yet Lenshina's background (particularly the
labour history of her father and of her husband), and Lumpa's period of 'incu-
bation' at Lubwa mission (1953-54), suggest the importance of éléments deriving
from the 'intensive contact situation'. Negative views concerning the missionaries,
the whites, colonialism were initially quite strong in Lumpa. Lenshina first visions
occurred around the time that the Central-African Fédération was created - a
controversial issue that had greatly enhanced the political awareness of the
African population, representing the first major defeat of Zambian nationalism.
There is, moreover, spécifie évidence of the nationalist element in Lumpa in the
early years (mid-1950's). Many of the early senior leaders of Lumpa were natio-
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nalists who for that reason had left the Lubwa Missioa establishment. Lumpa
gatherings were used for nationalist propaganda. In 1954, even the then leader of
Zambian nationalism, Harry Nkumbula, had a meeting with Alice to enlist her
support for the nationalist cause.21) Lumpa seemed to develop into a textbook
démonstration of Balandier's well-known view that independent churches are
'at the origin of nationalism which are still unsophisticated but unequivocal in
their expression' (Balandier 1965:443).
Lumpa's closeness to the nationalist movement was emphasized by the most
authoritative early studies of Lumpa (Rotberg 1961; Taylor & Lehmann 1961).
These authors, whose fieldwork took place in the late 1950's, were entirely unable
to predict Lumpa's clash with UNIP in the early 1960's.
From the very beginning, however, the symbolic idiom in which Lenshina' ex-
pressed her message belonged not to the stream of prolétarisation, but to that of
peasantization. This is clear from Lenshina's emphasis on ecological ritual (al-
most an anachronism within the development of Central-African religieus inno-
vation), sorcery-eradiction, and the construction of a new, exclusively local,
rural society. As the movement spread over N.B. Zambia, these peasant éléments
became more and more dominant. Lumpa became primarily a means to over-
come the predicament of peasantization. In its emphasis on the création of a
new, local society, the incorporation of that society in the wider structures of
capitalism and the colonial state (the frame of référence of the proletarization
response, including nationalism), became increasingly irrelevant. Whereas it
could be maintained that Lumpa initially straddled both the urban and the rural
stream of super-structural reconstruction, it gradually went through a process of
accommodation to the peasant outlook. This was rather analogous to the rural
transformation of Watchtower a quarter of a Century earlier. The constitution
of the Lumpa church, drawn up in 1957, preludes on the outcome of this process:
the church is there presented as non-racial, not a political party, and not opposed
to the laws of the country - thus opting out of the nationalist position.22)
By becoming more and more specifically a peasant movement, Lumpa could
no longer accomodate those of its members whose expériences at rural missions,
bornas, and in town were more deeply rooted in thé proletarization process. This
partly explains thé décline of Lumpa in N.B. Zambia since the late 1950's. By
that time many of thé Lumpa adhérents returned to their mission churches.
Others heeded the call of the rapidly expanding rural branches of UNIP. En
trenched in its exclusively rural and local outlook, Lumpa was working out a form
of peasant class struggle quite incompatible with the nationalist emphasis on
wider incorporation and on the state. By thé same token, thé urban branches
of Lumpa became increasingly divorced from thé rural developments in thé
church. While their relation to nationalism remains a subject for further study,
it is clear that they did dissociate themselves from rural Lumpa in thé latter's
final conflict with the state (Roberts 1972:43,47).
21) Rotberg 1961:75f; Macpherson 1974:238, however cf. p. 180; Mulford 1967:40;
Kaunda as quoted in Emanuel 1964:198; Northern News (Zambia) 19/6/1965,
which contains Nkumbula's statement.
22) Rotberg 1961:71; Taylor and Lehmann 1961:253; Gertzel n.d.:36; Warren, as
quoted in Information ... 1964:940.
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If Lumpa gradually defined itself as a peasant movement aiming at a radical
reversion of thé process of peasantization, let us now consider thé non-ritual
ways by which Lumpa attempted to achieve this.
On thé level of social relations, the belief in thé eradication of sorcery created
a new social climate where thé very strict moral rulings of the Lumpa church
were observed to an amazing extent. This was for instance noticeable in thé
field of sexual and marital relations (Taylor & Lehmann 1961:266). In many
respects, moreover, Lumpa tried to revive thé old super-structure, in which
concern for the land and fertility, protection against sorcery, général morality,
and political and economie power had all combined in one holistic conception
of the rural society. However, the new society was to be a théocratie one, in
which all autority had to dérive from God and his prophetess, Lenshina. The
borna, chiefs, Local Courts, as they had no access to this authority, were de-
nounced and ignored. In the judicial sphère, cases would be taken to Lenshina
and her senior church leaders, who tried them to the satisfaction of the Lumpa
adhérents involved. For some years Chinsali district was in fact predominantly
Lumpa. Very frequent communication was maintained between the various
branches and headquarters, e.g. by means of pilgrimage and the continuous cir-
culation of church choirs through the countryside. Under these conditions the
création of an alternative, church-administered authority structure was no illusion,
but a workable reality. Two recent comprehensive studies of Lumpa (Calmettes
1970; Roberts 1972) emphasize this aspect of the effective reconstruction of
thé rural society.
These indications are already highly significant, as they demonstrate Lumpa's
temporary success in functioning as a focus of control independently from thé
state. The nationalist leaders were not so far off the mark when they denounced
Lumpa for attempting to form 'a state within the state'. For while Lumpa im-
plicitly denied the legitimacy of the colonial state and its post-colonial successor,
it attempted to create a structure of control comparable to the state, if at a
much smaller scale geographically.
However, thé super-structural achievements would have been meaningless,
even impossible, without some infra-structural basis. Did Lumpa actually ex-
periment with new relations of production which counteracted incorporation of
thé local Community into capitalism and the state? As no primary data on Lumpa
have been collected with this spécifie question in mind, thé évidence is scanty,
but does contain some interesting points. The very substantial donations from
Lumpa church branches, individual members, and pilgrims, accumulated at
Sioni. They were used not only for Lenshina's household and retinue, but also
towards thé création of a chain of rural stores. Trucks were purchased both to
stock thé stores and to transport church choirs between thé branches and head-
quarters. Without further information it is difficult to say whether this represents
merely thé attempt of Lumpa leaders to launch themselves as entrepreneurs, or
rather a move to create a self-sufficient distribution System as independent as
possible from outside control. However, further examples do bear out Lumpa's.
experiments with économie relations that were widely at variance with capita-
lism and that remind much more of the economie ideals of the old village
society. The huge Lumpa cathedral was built in 1956-58 by the various church
branches in a form of tribute labour, with no outside assistance. The continuous
circulation of pilgrims and choir-members through thé countryside of N.B.
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Zambia représentée! another interesting economie feature. These Lumpa adhérents
had to be fed gratis by the local villagers, to whom they were often strangers. They
were not always welcome and were likened to locusts. Yet this institution sug-
gests the potential of the economie network created by Lumpa.
The most significant move towards a new infra-structure revolved on land
and land rights - as befits a peasant movement. In this context it is important
to note that for the population of N.B. Zambia the process of peasantization
started not with the imposition of colonial rule, but with the formation of the
Bemba state, about the 18th Century (Roberts 1973). Chiefs at various positions
in the Bemba chiefly hierarchy had assumed rights over the allocation of land.
The colonial state had largely reinforced these rights, while claiming for itsejf
the power to acknowledge or demote the chiefs. Lumpa's attempt to create a
new rural society and (to some extent) new relations of production, inevitably
called for a territorial basis on which a contiguous, exclusively Lumpa popula-
tion could pursue their new social, economie and religieus life. Lumpa adhérents
began to resettle, primarily around Sioni, where apparently hundreds of them
concentrated. Accepting only théocratie authority, they did not ask permission
from the chiefs. In this way they challenged the fundamental property rights
on which their rural production system had been based for two centuries or
more. That the issue was indeed vital not only in terms of my theory but also
for the Lumpa adhérents, the chiefs, and the state, is clear from the fact that
this conflict of 'unauthorized' settlement led to the first violent clashes between
Lumpa ant and the police, in 1959 (Rotberg 1961:76f; Roberts 1972:32). In the
years that followed, land as a key issue in rural relations of production continued
to play the rôle one would expect it to play in a peasant movement struggling
to create a new infra-structure. Soon, Lenshina tried to purchase land, which
was greatly opposed, and resented, by the chiefs and by the increasingly non-
Lumpa population. As UNIP/Lumpa tensions mounted (see below), Lumpa
adhérents withdrew into a number of exclusively Lumpa villages, which were
again 'unauthorized' from the point of view of the chiefs and the state. In July
1964 Kaunda's ultimatum to abandon these villages expired. Two police officers
on patrol visited one such village; the inhabitants allegedly understood that they
came to demolish the village, and killed them. This started the final conflict,
whose outcome was, inter alia, the démolition of all Lumpa villages and of the
Lumpa cathedral.
The conflict with the chiefs over land showed how Lumpa, in ils création
of a new rural society, clashed with individuals and groups who opted out of
the Lumpa order and who, at the same time, were in a position to mobilize the
forces of the state against Lumpa. Mere ordinary villagers who were opposed
to Lumpa were not in such a position. If they did not want to join Lumpa, social
pressure was brought to bear on them: formost the allégation that they were
sorcerers and for that reason shunned a church concentrating on sorcery eradi-
cation; also, occasinally, they were exposed to downright violence from Lumpa
side (Clairmonte 1964). Among many joiners, the obligations (in terms of time,
money and commitment) imposed by the church were increasingly feit as a
bürden; but particularly while Lumpa was still strong these dissenters risked
serious conflicts and ostracism if they defected to the mission churches or the
nationalist party.
A group which, besides the chiefs, succesfully mobilized the state against
Lumpa was the Roman Catholic church. This church had been the first to esta-
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blish missions in the area, and was by far the greatest Christian dénomination
in N.E. Zambia at the eve of Lenshina's appearance as a prophet. Lenshina came
from a Protestant background, where at the time strong anti-Catholic feelings
had not yet given way to the ecumenism of the latest decade. Moreover, Lumpa
was opposed to sorcery and to all ritual objects that could be considered sorcery
apparatus; therefore it found much more fault with the very elaborate Roman
Catholic devotional paraphernalia than with the austère, mainly verbal Protestant
worship (Chéry 1959; Calmettes 1970, 1972). These two factors made
Lumpa particularly inimical to local Catholic missions and their senior personnel.
The rapid spread of Lumpa virtually exterminated a major Catholic stronghold
in Central Africa, and so caused bitter animosity among the Catholic leaders.
Catholic mission-workers on tour were increasingly harassed. In 1956 an African
Catholic priest, when visiting a village, was called a sorcerer. He set in motion
the judicial machinery (accusation of sorcery is a criminal offence under the
Witchcraft Ordinance). The offending party was detained at the district head-
quarters. A crowd of Lumpa adhérents headed by Lenshina's husband protested
against this, and a confrontation with the administration ensued which even-
tually led to Petros Chitankwa being sentenced to two years of hard labour
(Rotberg 1961:76; Roberts 1972:22).
The last and most important conflict between Lumpa and a local group was
with UNIP. After Lenshina had been away for over a year, visiting the urban
Lumpa churches, she returned to find her church declining and UNIP increa-
singly controlling the countryside. She reacted very strongly to this state of
affairs. In 1962 she forbade Lumpa adhérents to join UNIP, publicly burned
party cards, and instead issued Lumpa membership tickets which may well have
been regarded as the counterpart of party cards. She was even reported to say
that the nationalist activists killed during 'Chachacha' would not go to heaven.
From the time of préparation for the 1962 général élection, bitter feuding
between UNIP and Lumpa took place, resulting in the sad official statistics con-
tained in table 1.2S)
murders
houses destroyed by arson
churches destroyed by arson




























Table 1. Officiai figures concerning UNIP/Lumpa feuding in N.B. Zambia
prior to the final conflict
M) Source: Report... 1965, as quoted in Times of Zambia 22/9/1965.
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The resettling in exclusively Lumpa villages was no longer, positively, the
création of a visible territorial basis for the new society. In stead, it had become
a retreat from an increasingly hostile environment. There are indications that
in the year preceding the final conflict eschatological expectations gained mo-
mentum among the Lumpa. They prepared to défend whatever was left of their
shortlived new world. They surrounded their villages by stockades, manufactured
simple weapons, and prepared magical substances intended to make them invul-
nérable. There were repeated attempts by the UNIP top leadership to bring
about a reconciliation between their local rank and file, and Lumpa. These
proved unsuccessful. When new fighting between a UNIP and a Lumpa village
broke out, as a result of a quarrel over school attendance (in 1964 Lenshina
had forbidden her followers to send their children to school), government
decided that Lumpa villages could no longer be tolerated, and issued the ulti-
matum leading to the final conflict.
Why did Lumpa at first accommodate nationalism, to reject it later on, en-
gaging in bitter feuding with local nationalists, which eventually lead to Lumpa's
virtual extermination? The answer Roberts gives (1972:55), and which Ranger
cites approvingly24), is that
'Bom Church and Party were competing for total allegiance. As I have argued,
it was their similarities as much as their différences, which brought them into
conflict.'
In the light of the tentative theoretical position I have developed hère, a
detailed assessment of the validity of this answer has become possible.
In defining itself more and more as an exclusive peasant movement, Lumpa
had to shed gradually such traits as it had initially shared with the nationalist
movement and with the proletarian response in général. These traits were without
solid roots in the peasant expérience. Lumpa had subsequently struggled to regain
local, rural control and to create new relations of production not dominated by
the rural community's wider incorporation in capitalism and the state. Once
Lumpa had taken this road, the (secular) state, and nationalism (as a set of
political ideas on the nature and the personnel of the state), were out of the
question. Alternatively, nationalism, as a response to the proletarian situation,
had found a final outcome in UNIP in 1959. UNIP accepted the basic infra-
structural of modern Central-African society, including the incorporation of
rural areas by the state and by capitalism. Less radical than Lumpa, therefore,
UNIP's blueprint of the future society was almost diametrically opposed to
Lumpa's. But if the incompatibility between UNIP and Lumpa derived from
a différence in class situation and from a différence in degree of radicalism in
the context of class struggle, we still have to explain why these two different
movements confronted each other with deadly hostility among the same rural
population of N.E. Zambia.
21) Ranger 1968:639; Ranger quoted from an earlier version of Roberts' analysis
than the 1972 one used for the present study.
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I have argued that the proletarian response is not confined to places of migrant
work, but may also found in spécifie rural settings: missions, bornas, military
campaigns. Could the UNIP/Lumpa opposition reflect a class différence within
the rural population of Chinsali district, in such a way that the persistent
Lumpa adhérents were more truly peasants, whereas those who filled the ranks
of the rural UNIP branches were more involved in the process of proletarization?
Again, the évidence is scanty, but this time it seems not to support the hypothe-
sis. Lumpa and UNIP villages were often adjacent. The UNIP/Lumpa division
often ran across close kinship ties, as in the school conflict referred to above
(Roberts 1972:45). We must conclude that in the early 1960's Lumpa and
UNIP represented rival options for social reconstruction amongst members
of the same peasant class in Chinsali district.
Perhaps we corne closer to an answer when we try to understand thé position
of UNIP as a proletarian response among a peasant population. Let us recall
thé process of accommodation to thé peasant class situation, such as happened
with Watchtower and, to a lesser extent, with Lumpa itself. Did not UNIP, too,
undergo a transformation before it could make an impact among thé peasants?
Superficially, there are indications in that direction. At the village level, UNIP
was much more than a strictly political movement aiming at territorial indepen-
dence. It became a way of life. It created, apparently, a state of millennarian
effervescence similar to that of more specifically peasant responses such as
sorcery-eradication and Lumpa. Already years before the new nationalist order
was realized at a national scale (with thé attainment of independence), UNIP
produced what Roberts called a 'cultural revival' in thé villages (1972:35). Thus,
like Watchtower and Lumpa, UNIP seems to have yielded to the model, so persist-
ent among Central-African peasants, of super-structural reconstruction at the
local scale of thé rural Community. If this were a correct assessment, thé peasants
siding with Lumpa would have had very much in common with those siding
with UNIP, they would hâve acted on the basis of thé same inspiration of rural
reconstruction, and Roberts' explanation would be basically correct. In this line
of argument, thé explanation of UNIP/Lumpa feuding would lie in thé alleged
fact that both were rival attempts at rural super-structural reconstruction. The
ultimate drive behind both movements, at thé village level, would then hâve
been against peasant aliénation, and towards thé primarily local restoration of
meaningfumess and compétence. The solution that each of the feudings groups
was propounding, would only have the power to convince its adhérents as long as
it remained, in the latter's eyes, absolute and without alternatives. People on
neither side could afford to yield - as they would be asserting, and defending, thé
very meaning they were giving to their lives.25)
However, this approach to UNIP-Lumpa feuding has three implications which
make us seriously doubt its validity. First, thé différent class références of
Lumpa and of UNIP, as peasant respectively proletarian responses, would hâve
to be immaterial: both would hâve to be transformed to serve a strictly local
peasant response. Secondly, UNIP in Chinsali district in thé early 1960's would
not have functioned primarily as a nationalist movement aiming at territorial
independence; rather, it would have adopted the nationalist symbolism and idiom
25) Such an explanation would corne close to the views of those writers who hâve
interpreted UNIP/Lumpa feuding as a clash between rival religions: Anonymous
1964; Franklin 1964. A similar suggestion in relation to thé clashes between
Zambian Watchtower and UNIP in Assimeng 1971:112.
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merely to serve some peasant movement of local scope. Thirdly, equally imma-
terial would have to be the fact that UNIP's solution to the peasants' predicament
was no solution at all, as its insistence on the state and its acceptance of)
capitalisai could only lead to a further incorporation and dependence of the
rural Community.
Although class formation in modern Africa follows notoriously devious dia-
lectics, these implications do appear too preposterous than that we could maintain
Roberts' explanation wholesale. The crucial issue is the mobilization process by
which UNIP established itself among the peasants of Chinsali district. But as
long as no new, detailed material is available on this point, let us try to modify
Roberts' solution in a way that takes the above implications into account.
Let us grant that UNIP in Chinsali district initially contained an element of
super-structural reconstruction at the purely local level - thus somewhat ac-
commodating to the typical peasant response. However, this element may soon
have worn out, as it became clear that UNIP aimed at intensifying, rather than
counteracting, wider incorporation, and that therefore UNIP was a powerful
mechanism in the very process of peasantization which the peasants were anxious
to reverse. Is it then not more realistic to explain UNIP/Lumpa feuding from the
fact that Lumpa, as rather successfully realizing a local, rural reconstruction of
both super-structure and infra-structure, represented in N.E. Zambia the main
obstacle to UNIP's striving towards wider incorporation? Those peasants siding
with UNIP would then be thé instruments to curb thé class struggle of the Lumpa
peasants. In that case not only thé final Lumpa/state conflict, but also the
preceding Lumpa/UNIP feuding at thé local level, would revolve around wider
incorporation, much more than around 'total commitment' (Roberts) at the vil-
lage level. There are indications that thé local feuding, and thé final clash
between Lumpa and the state, were two stages of the same overall conflict.
Not only was Lumpa in both cases confronted with UNIP, first in thé form of
rural branches, finally in thé form of a UNIP-dominated transition government.
There is also the suggestion that thé rural feuding was accepted by the UNIP
top leadership as rather compatible with UNIP's basic orientation. With UNIP
rural aggression heavily outweighing Lumpa's (table 1, based on a state-commis-
sioned enquiry), is it not significant that no extensive records seem to exist
of UNIP members in Chinsali district having been tried, after independence, for
offences just as criminal as those so loudly decried when committed by Lumpa?
Let me emphasize that there is not the slightest indication whatsoever that rural
UNIP aggression was instigated by thé national UNIP leaders; in fact, thé latter
tried repeatedly to stop thé feuding - if only Lumpa was prepared to accept
UNIP control, However, thé necessity to exterminate Lumpa, and movements
like it, is at thé root of UNIP and similar reformist nationalist movements, ir-
respective of thé high personal standards of integrity and non-violence of the
leaders involved. Far from transforming UNIP into a peasant movement of
purely local scope, UNIP adhérents in Chinsali district attacked Lumpa on thé
basis of a consistent application of the logic of UNIP nationalism. However
regrettable, and however deeply regretted by Kaunda and his colleagues, the
feuding was rather inévitable.
4. RELIGION AND THE STATE IN MODERN ZAMBIA:
THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMATION
Having attempted to explain the reasons of the conflict between Lumpa and
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various other groups in rural N.E. Zambia, my argument already contains the
éléments on the basis of which the final conflict between Lumpa and the state
can be understood. However, it is useful to discuss this issue in extenso, as such
a discussion may also throw light upon the relations between the Zambian state
and contemporary churches in général.
In my introduction I have pointed out that the Lumpa rising was a bitter
disappointment for the Zambian nationalists, and a threat to their international
public image. However, meanwhile we have identified more profound reasons
for the state's stern reaction to Lumpa.
The primary reason was, of course, that Lumpa did represent a very real
threat to the state. Although declining, and greatly harassed by conflicts with
other groups in N.B. Zambia, Lumpa represented to the end a successful peasant
movement, comprising many thousands of people, and binding these people in
an effective organization that radically rejected state control and that was be-
ginning to define its own infra-structure. With the years rural Lumpa did not
settle down as a tolerant dénomination attuned to the institutions of the wider
society, but instead became increasingly intransigent vis-a-vis the outside world.
Short of giving up the modern conception of the national state, or at least em-
barking upon a fundamental discussion of this conception, the logic of the
state left no option but breaking the power of Lumpa once for all. And this
is what happened.
Additional reasons helped to shape the course of events. Taking the funda-
mental assumptions of the modem state for granted, the nationalists, once in
power, proved as staunch supporters of state-enforced law and order as their
colonial predecessors had ever been. A major justification for the sending of
government troops was that the Lumpa adhérents, in trying to create 'a state
within the state', had become criminals.26) Moreover, there were tenacious
rumours as to Lumpa's links with Welensky's United Fédéral Party (the na-
tionalists' main opponent), and with Tshombe's secessionist movement in Zaïre.
So far the évidence for this allégation bas been scanty (Roberts 1972:35f;
Macpherson 1974:410). It seems difficult to bring in line such political manoeu-
vering with the situation of the Lumpa church, which in 1963-64 increasingly
entrenched itself in a retreatist and eschatological attitude. But whatever the
facts, belief in these links with UNIP's enemies appears to have influenced the
UNIP-dominated government at the eve of independence.
A third complex of reasons revolves around the problem of légitimation of
the modern state. The following extracts from a speech of Kaunda show that
the UNIP government was not merely trying to enforce its monopoly of power,
but also tried to underpin its own legitimacy in the eyes of the Zambian popula-
tion by presenting itself as the suprême guardian of religion and morality.
Speaking about Lumpa, Kaunda says
26) E. g. M. Chona, the later Vice-Président, as quoted in Information . . . 1964:9401;
Charlton 1969:140 quotes almost identical statements by Re v. Colin Morris. Morris
has been one of Kaunda's main advisers. In 1964, as president of the United
Church of Zambia (U.C.Z.), hè organized the churches' réhabilitation mission
to the area where the final conflict was fought. In 1965 hè campaigned to draw
Lenshina into the U.C.Z. fold - which failed.
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'They have become anti-society. They have been known, husband and wife,
to plan to kill their own parents because they were non-Lumpa Church mem-
bers and this they have done. ( . . . )
'Innocent villagers and children trying to escape from their burning homes
have been captured by the followers of Lenshina and thrown back alive into
the fiâmes. Senior men in the country's security services have reported that the
Lumpa followers have no human feelings and their ferocious attacks on security
forces bear out the fanatical nature of what I can only describe again as lunatics.
( . . . )
'I have no intention whatsoever of again unleashing such evil forces. Let me
end by reiterating that my Government has no désire whatsoever to interfère
with any individual's religieus beliefs but ( . . . ) such a noble principle can only
be respected where those charged with thé spiritual, and I believe moral side
of life, are sufficiently responsible to realize that freedom of worship becomes
a menace and not a value when their sect commits murder and arson in thé
name of religion.
'No clean-living and thinking man can accept the Lenshina 'Passports to Hea-
ven' as anything more than worthless pièces of paper - a usurping by an imposter
of the majesty of God Almighty. Such teaching cannot be allowed to continue
to corrupt our people and cannot and would not be tolerated by any responsible
govemment' (Legum 1966:109).
In the context of modem Zambian society there can be little misunderstanding
that hère Kaunda is describing thé Lumpas as sorcerers, and tries to mobilize
ail thé abhorrence that thé général population feels with regard to sorcerers.
Kaunda even points out, in thé same passage, thé need for thé Lumpa to be
cleansed before they can return to human society:
'When they have surrendered and look back at their actions, some of thèse
people realize the horror, damage and sadness they hâve brought to this young
nation and say plainly that they require some treatment to bring them back to
sanity. They just cannot understand why they acted as they did' (Legum, 1966:
109).
Kaunda présents and justifies state action in terras of religions and moral
beliefs: thé anti-social nature of sorcerers, and the 'majesty of God Almighty'.
Thèse beliefs hâve a very strong appeal among thé gréât majority of the modem
Zambian population. By invoking them, Kaunda is in fact claiming, implicitly,
a suprême moral and religieus légitimation for his govemment. Yet his govern-
ment has already, secularly, thé füllest possible legitimacy in terms of the
constitutional and démocratie procédures from which its mandate derived. Why,
then, this need to appeal to a religious basis for thé légitimation of the Zambian
state?
Hère we hâve reached thé point where Lumpa illustrâtes thé precarious si-
tuation of the modem, post-colonial state in Zambia, due to thé latter's incom-
plète légitimation in the eyes of a significant portion of the Zambian population.
Whatever its access to means of physical coercion, the ultimate légitimation
of a bureaucratie System like the state lies, in Weber's terms, in
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'a belief in thé "legality" of patterns of normative raies and thé right of those
elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)' (Weber
1964:328).
Now how does one establish, and maintain, such a légitimation if part of the
state's subjects are peasants for whom such an abstract, universalist 'legal
authority', and the formal bureaucratie organisations based upon it, virtually
have no meaning - in whose social expérience at any rate they play no dominant
part?
In Zambia, this problem has been duly acknowledged, if in different terms.
Under the heading of 'nation-building', a tremendous effort has been launched
along such lines as political mobilization; youth movement; women's movement;
spécifie school curricula incorporating training for citizenship; rural development,
etc. Populism, here in the form of the ideology of Zambian Humanism, emerged
as an attempt to overcome, if not to ignore, the fundamental problems inherent
in the situation. The careful management of relations with the chiefs is part
of the same effort. At the district level chiefs have retained considérable authority
and state stipends, and nationally they are represented in the House of Chiefs.
These arrangements (which, incidentally, strikingly contrast with the position
assigned to chiefs in the Lumpa blueprint of society) constitute an attempt to
incorporate rural, local foei of authority into the central govemment structure -
so as to let the latter benefit from the additional légitimation which this link
with traditional authority may offer. Where this attempt fails, the state curtails
the chiefs privileges (e.g. Caplan 1970:191f), but such moves do not necessarily
reduce the chiefs' actual authority among the rural population. Ethnie and
regional allegiances, as threats to 'nation-building' and as challenges, either im-
plicit of explicit, of the supremacy of the state, are likewise denounced by the
elite.
Lumpa, as the largest and most powerful peasant movement Zambia has yet
seen, drove home the fact that large sections of the Zambian peasantry still opt
out of the national state. Lumpa antagonized precisely the grass-roots processes
by which the post-colonial state expects to solve its problem of incomplete légi-
timation. For a national elite who find, to a gréât extent, in the state not only
their livelihood but also the anchorage of their identity, this is a disconcerting
fact, which hushing-up and ostentatious reconciliation may help to repress from.
consciousness. For thé élite thé situation is unconfortable indeed, for thé exter-
mination of Lumpa has by no means solved thé much wider problem of the
incorporation of peasants into thé Zambian state. New peasant movements are
likely to émerge which, like Lumpa, may eniploy a religious idiom in an attempt
to regain local control and to challenge wider incorporation.27)
27) Lanternari made an interesting attempt to interpret Lumpa, along with similar
movements, in terms of urban-rural relations. In his view, '... les villages ( . . . ) re-
présentent des 'groupes de pression' contra la politique de déculturation et de
dépersonalisation de certaines élites dirigeantes. (...) .. .les mouvements religieux
a tendance néo-traditionaliste de la période post-coloniale renferment un avertisse-
ment à l'adresse des élites insuffisamment 'décolonisées'. Ils sont la manifestation
d'un besoin pressant d'intégration des valeurs que la civilisation occidentale a
exportées en Afrique Noire, sans réussir à les intégrer dans l'arrière-plan culturel
des sociétés indigènes' (1966:110). While thus recognizing that incorporation pro-
cesses lie at thé root of such conflicts as between Lumpa and the state, Lanternari
only stresses super-structural éléments and ignores thé fundamental issues of
class and thé distribution of power.
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Meanwhile, given the général problem of légitimation, it is obvious that
religion bas a very significant rôle to play in Zambia and other Central-African
states. On the basis of a rather widespread and homogeneous cultural substratum,
similar religieus innovations (of the kinds I have discussed in section 2) occurred
throughout Central Africa. Sorcery beliefs and the prominence of the High
God form the two main constants in the emerging religieus system of modern
Zambia. This system is adhered to among virtually the entire African popula-
tion of the country, no matter what varions spécifie religions forms thé people
pursue. The process of secularization, so marked in North-Atlantic society, bas
not replicated itself in Central Africa - yet. Therefore, some form of appeal to
this shared religious system could provide extensive légitimation for contempo-
rary authority structures (cf. Kuper 1976), albeit along unes rather différent
from those stipulated by Weber under thé heading of légal authority. For thé
resuit would be neither légal nor traditional authority, but charismatic authority.
In thé speech cited above, and in numerous other instances, Kaunda and other
Zambian political leaders hâve employed a religious idiom to underpin thé
authority of themselves and of the state bureaucracy they represent. The situation
is however complicated by thé existence of religious organisations, mainly in thé
form of Christian churches. Thèse churches, having reached various stages in
thé process of the routinization of charisma (Weber 1964:363f), hâve a rather
direct access to religious légitimation. They generale a considérable social po-
wer, through their large number of adhérents, thé latfer's effective organization,
their loyality, and often also through their above-average standards of éducation
and income. Of course, thé churches use their legitimating potential in thé fîrst
instance for their own benefit. Therefore their social power is, at least latently,
rival to that of the state and the party.
Between the established Christian churches (Roman Catholic Church, United
Church of Zambia, Reformed Church in Zambia, Anglican Church, etc.), and the
Zambian state, a not always easy, but on the whole productive symbiosis has
developed.w) The churches lend both their expertise and their legitimating po-
tential to the government, in exchange for very considérable autonomy in the
religious field. The settings in which this interaction takes shape include public
ceremonies in which political and religious leaders partake side by side; the
implementation of 'development'; the participation of religious leaders in govern-
mental and party committees; and informai consultations between top-ranking
political and religious leaders. An important factor in this pattern seems to be
the fact that the established Zambian churches dérive from North-Atlantic ones
that, in their countries of origin, had already solved the problem of the relation
between church and state prior to missionary expansion in Aifrica. Even so, there
have been minor clashes, and more serions ones may follow in the future. For
state-church symbiosis cannot really solve the problem of the state's incomplete
légitimation in terms of legal authority. A religious underpinning of the state's
authority automatically implies enhancing the authority of the religious organi-
zations, which may thus come to represent, through a feed-back, an even greater
challenge to the state's authority. Ultimately, a shift towards purely legal authori-
*8) A recent example that shows that the established churches do occasionally anta-
gonize, rather than legitimize, the Zambian state, is the protest by the Zambia
Council of Churches against the banning of the Kimbanguist Church (Mirror,
Zambia, 50, July 1976, p. 1).
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ty for the state may require a process of 'disenchantment' (already noticeble in
the Zambian political, and especially the educational, elite). Such a process
would undermine the churches' authority and would be likely to bring the latter
to concerted remonstrance in one form or another.
For the independent churches the situation tends to be more acutely difficult.
Although it is still far too early to generalize, these independent churches seem
to cater typically for Zambians in the early stages of proletarization. The inde-
pendent churches are most in évidence at the local level: the bornas and the
urban compounds. The super-structural reconstruction they offer their adhérents,
and the extensive extra-religious impact they make on the latter's lives (e.g. in
the sphère of récréation, marriage, domestic conflict, illness, death, burial), not
infrequently clash with the local party organization which often works along
similar unes. Despite instances of felicitous co-operation between independent
church and party at the local level28), conflict reminiscent of the UNIP/Lumpa
feuding seems more frequent. Among the Zambian elite there is little knowledge
of and less sympathy for the independent churches. Not only the party, but also
the established churches tend to see them as a threat. It is therefore unlikely
that the independent churches will ever be called upon, to any significant extent,
to play the religiously legitimizing rôle which the established churches now
regularly perform for the state. The Lumpa rising provides an extreme example
of what form church/state interaction can take in the context of independent
churches. On the other hand, the organizational and interprétative experiments
still going on in the Zambian independent churches may represent a major mode
of super-structural reconstruction in the decades to come - with presumably
profound repercussions for the state and the nationalist movement.
5. CONCLUSION
This article represents an attempt to explore the deeper structural implications
of the Lumpa rising, in the context of religious innovation, class formation, and
the state in Zambia. In presenting a tentative interprétation, my main ambition
has been to highlight a number of problems, and to indicate a direction in which
some answers may be found in the future.
Meanwhile, many important problems have not even been mentioned in the
present argument. If Lumpa was essentially a peasant movement, pursuing an
idiom of religious innovation that was far from unique in the Central-African
context, why was it yet unique in its scope and historical development, and why
did it occur precisely among the Bemba of N.B. Zambia? Another important
problem, that can throw light both on Lumpa and on the relations between
the state and the established churches, is the development of relations between
the established churches and Lumpa during and after the rising. The churches
organized a rehabilitation mission right into the areas of combat, and afterwards
the United Church of Zambia (in which Lubwa's Church of Scotland had merg-
ed) even tried to win Lenshina back into its fold. As more data become available,
these issues may be tackled successfully.
At the moment, many essential data on the Lumpa episode are still lacking.
The sociology of contemporary Zambian religion still largely remains to be
29) E.g. in the Gondwe Watchtower Community, Cross 1970.
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written. And the whole Lumpa tragedy and its aftermath. is still cause of grief
for thousands of Zambians from all walks of life. Under these circumstances,
nothing but the most preliminary analysis is possible; but even such an analysas
may be helpful in defining tasks, and not just academie ones, for the future.
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